arXiv:1605.07524 Date: submitted by
2017-03-24 Author(s): Maria Apostolaki
, Aviv Zohar
, Laurent Vanbever
As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate ~50% of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately.
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Hello, I am back. So before I start, this is not a deep web or darknet story, this is just a true story on why I stopped hacking blind. submitted by
Back in 2016 I was in a hacking group, now I'm not going to say what our name was, it wasn't very popular but we were in the realm of twitch raiding. Our small group of about 9 would go on twitch and find children or just anyone stupid enough to do what "Twitch support" says. I called this game Simon Says, because we would social engineer these people to give us their streamkey and we would IP log them, then DDoS them offline and hijack their stream. I can admit back then we didn't give a damn, we would stream isis home movies on these children's stream, just to watch for that message saying "This channel has be deleted due to term violation". I will admit, we did do good. We started up going this popular camera chat website, I'm sure all of you have been on before. I know there are a lot of naked pervs on there with their you know what's out. If you typed the right tags and search terms, you get to the real pedophiles, and I'm talking about vpns and proxies asking S2R and bitcoin. Yeah, I know what you're thinking, you've been on that site and never came across them. I know some individuals of lizard squad were wanting to take down pedophiles too, but didn't know they were on that site. After a while of reversing polarities and ratting, We moved onto mass scanning. Back in the 90s there was this program called Defcon, and it was like a telephone port scanner, I downloaded a copy of it and tried to decompile it.. With no success. So I wrote my own version of it, but more modern day. My Defcon would grab a text file of randomly generated IP addresses and it would try to connect to port 23 on each ip. One day running a scan I picked up a telnet server, and I immediately open a telnet client on my computer and connected to this server. I sat there for a good 7 hours trying every possible username and password, and still got nothing. I sent the IP and port to some of the members and I went to bed. I woke up to a message containing the words "Guest:Password", I immediately start a group call. Now it would of been about 3:30 AM here in australia at the time. I dread to think who was sleeping. I said how Jack found the username and password, so we all stupidly try to log in to the same guest account at once, and only I got in. I shared my screen on skype and tried going through the logs of this mysterious server to try to find what it is. We were guessing at what it could be. A member we are going to call Jake due to I don't want to drop anyones dox, now Jake thought it must of been a power plant or a water plant. I thought it was most likely an ISP switch, because that's mostly what I would find and break into. We all were taking our guesses on what it could be, so I go in deeper into the server and start changing some values and ones and zeros. After messing around changing crap and creating random files and folders with stupid names, I found in the root folder an ID block. SSH session keys and a lovely ID that says "Children's hospital". I start swearing over and over, a few people left the call and didn't want to know what they just read. I trace the IP from an online ISP IP tracker. The IP came back to Bangkok. I google all over around for a children's hospital in Bangkok and found nothing. A day went past, after I threw away the IP Address and I hadn't slept. I set up google to notify me when something in the news feed containing the words "Bangkok", "Hacked", "Hospital". Three sleepless days later, I get an ding. Now, I don't know if it was just a coincidence or if it was some joke and I'm paranoid and it's from the lack of sleep. I hesitated clicking on it, I was hovering my mouse over the link, trying to click it but couldn't. Instead of clicking it, I broke down crying about what I did, because, it turned out that the settings I was messing with, after my friend Jack logged back in via a ratted relay, the settings were for life support systems. I was hoping it was all just a dream. I spent the next 3 to 5 months in complete paranoia from it. I ended up leaving the group and trying to run from what I did. I joined a new group, new hackers, had no idea about what I did. I taught them were to find pedophiles, and we set up this gig were we would extort pedophiles for bitcoin and give them our word we wouldn't call the police if they donated some coins. Of course we went back, and tipped off their local tipline and sent screenshots with faces and of the gross content. I couldn't really do it anymore and I kept being reminded of my past and what I hacked into, so I tried to leave this group. But I got messed about with my cut of coins, so I just left. Very annoyed. I tried to join another hacking group for a bit, but still the same thing, I couldn't run from the guilt, so I just stopped all together. And now 2018, I just write crappy programs and I teach people on youtube how to also write these programs. I think about what I did every day. People tell me it's not my fault, I was a stupid kid, but I always feel and know it was. It always eats at me all the time. It is my greatest shame. I tried to go back and find the news report just to know how many children I might of killed, but I couldn't find it anymore. I do not have access to that email anymore and that really anoys me the most. I am sharing this because I hope it help me try to not be eaten away from it, so I can move on with my life and do something great So for the next young 16 or 17 year old who goes on a hacking spree, just know what you're breaking into first. =======Feel free to comment and redistribute this in anyway you want, even if it's just to throw me over the hot coals.========= Thank you for taking the time to read all of this. -S.C
The cryptographer also explained that the Russian purchased all the coins in 2016 for around $10k. However, the investor put the bitcoin into an encrypted zip file and after some time passed, he forgot his password. “In that attack, I needed five files to break into a zip archive,” Stay recalled. “This one only had two files in it. Defcon 28 “safe mode” presentations got interesting on August 5, when ex-Google employee Mike Stay told a story about how he rescued $300k worth of bitcoin from an encrypted zip file. It can only be termed a tragedy if you own thousands of Bitcoin yet cannot access it because you saved them in a password-protected ZIP file, and later forgot the password.. The person who recently faced this tragedy is a Russian investor, who reportedly bought Bitcoin worth $1.5 million back in 2016, before the historic rate hike of cryptocurrencies in 2017. Artem is a Penetration Tester at Kaspersky Lab. On time between red team engagements he is doing security research of software and hardware appliances. Author of multiple CVE's on VMware Virtualization Platforms (CVE-2016-5331, CVE-2016-7458, CVE-2016-7459, CVE-2016-7460). The Guy had bought around $10,000 worth of bitcoin in January 2016, well before the boom. ... In a talk at the Defcon security conference this week, Stay details the epic attempt that ensued.
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